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Death Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Janet C. Hoeffel

∗

I. INTRODUCTION
In the forty-four years since the Court employed the Eighth
Amendment to temporarily suspend the death penalty in the
United States in Furman v. Georgia1 in 1972, the Court has
spilled an enormous amount of ink attempting to instruct the
states on how to properly guide jurors’ discretion in imposing
the death penalty. Yet, in its voluminous Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Justices spilled not one drop suggesting the
familiar and unifying standard of beyond a reasonable doubt as a
guide.
The Court has finally and recently inched toward this
standard in capital cases, not through an Eighth Amendment
lens, but through the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial. In
2000, Apprendi v. New Jersey2 was the Court’s watershed Sixth
Amendment case marking the expansion of the jury trial right
into new realms. The Court brought its newly-minted jury trial
analysis to bear in the penalty phase of capital cases in both Ring
v. Arizona3 in 2002 and Hurst v. Florida4 in 2016. In both cases,
the Court held that a jury, and not a judge, must find the
Catherine D. Pierson Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I wish to thank the
Arkansas Law Review for putting together this symposium on the future of the death
penalty, the other participants in the symposium, and Arkansas law professors Laurent
Sacharoff and Brian Gallini for inviting me. I also want to thank the faculty at Tulane Law
School who participated in a presentation of an earlier draft of this Article, including Keith
Werhan, Ann Lipton, and Sally Richardson. For close reading and advice, I also thank
Pamela Metzger and Stephen Singer. Finally, for his exhaustive research, I am indebted to
Alan Williams.
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
4. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
∗
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aggravating factor or factors, at least one of which is necessary
for a death verdict, and that the jury must find the existence of
that factor or factors beyond a reasonable doubt.5
This Article explains that a robust application of Apprendi
to capital cases goes further than the narrow holdings of Ring
and Hurst. Justice Sotomayor strongly hints at this extension in
her opinion for seven members of the Court in Hurst.6 The
Court seems poised to go the next step. To apply Apprendi in
earnest is to apply it in light of the history of the jury trial and
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in capital cases. The
logic and language of Hurst v. Florida and the historical
underpinnings of the right to have a jury make certain findings
beyond a reasonable doubt lead to the conclusion that jurors
must make all determinations necessary for the imposition of
death beyond a reasonable doubt.
While states have different statutory schemes for how death
is decided, known as “weighing” versus “non-weighing”
schemes, it makes little difference when applying the jury trial
right. If jurors have to find that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors before death may be imposed, then jurors
have to find that beyond a reasonable doubt.7 If jurors have to
find the defendant represents a future danger in a non-weighing
state, it must be found beyond a reasonable doubt.8 In all cases,
in all schemes, the final judgment jurors must make is whether,
in the end, death is the appropriate punishment. This Article
argues they must find this to be the case beyond a reasonable
doubt.9
Because the Court is paying close attention to history in
expanding the jury trial right into new realms, Part I of this
Article sets out the history of the right to trial by jury and the
origins of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, with a
particular focus on capital cases. It describes the importance of
both to protect the collective rights of the people: to have
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624.
See infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 142-43, 161-64, 179-80 and accompanying text.
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twelve members of the community unanimously decide death
instead of a single jurist and to impose the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard on the decision, to protect those jurors from the
angst of eternal damnation lest they are responsible for killing an
innocent man.
Part II then describes the Court’s own recent development
of the jury trial right, relying heavily on history at the time of the
founding of the nation. In the non-capital arena, from Apprendi
through Alleyne v. United States,10 the Court has viewed this
right robustly and expansively. In the capital arena, the Court
has not yet had the opportunity to develop the right more fully,
as the appellants in both Ring and Hurst asked a narrow, discrete
question of the Court. However, this Part describes how the
language of Hurst demonstrates the Court recognizes the next
steps. This Part also gives the lay of the land, showing a deep
split in the states as far as the use of reasonable doubt in the
jury’s decision-making on the imposition of death.
Part III brings history and Hurst’s logic and language
together to demonstrate how, to comply with Apprendi, the jury,
and not a judge, must decide the ultimate issue, separate and
apart from preceding issues like the weighing decision. One
jurist has embraced this wholeheartedly. In Rauf v. State,11 the
Delaware Supreme Court issued a per curium opinion ruling
Delaware’s death penalty statute unconstitutional in light of a
broad reading of Hurst.12 Chief Justice Strine wrote separately,
for three of the Justices:
From the inception of our Republic, the unanimity
requirement and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
have been integral to the jury’s role in ensuring that no
defendant should suffer death unless a cross section of the
community unanimously determines that should be the
case, under a standard that requires them to have a high
degree of confidence that execution is the just result.13

10.
11.
12.
13.

133 S. Ct. 2151, 2159-60, 2163-64 (2013).
145 A.3d 430, 432-33 (Del. 2016).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 437.
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The logic, history, and conclusion, are inescapable, and the
Court appears willing to entertain the conclusion if presented
with the question.

II. HISTORY OF JURY TRIALS AND BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT: COLLECTIVE RIGHTS OF
THE COMMUNITY
In modern day practice and language, the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial belongs to the criminal
defendant14 and the due process clause gives the defendant the
right to make the prosecution prove its case against him beyond
a reasonable doubt.15 These rights inure to the benefit of the
individual criminal defendant, who otherwise would be left to
the discretion of one jurist with no standards to guide him.
While it is certainly and undeniably true that these are
individual rights of the defendant, they are also both, now and
historically, rights of the community.16 Often forgotten, it
seems, is the history of both the jury trial and the reasonable
doubt standard as stemming from the concerns of the
community, most particularly in capital cases. This section will
explore the history of these two intertwined features of the
criminal justice system to demonstrate their origin as collective
rights of the community.

14. See U.S. CONST. amend VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions
reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice
administered. [The defendant’s] right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent oppression by the Government.”).
15. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (“The accused during a criminal
prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility he
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and
freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when
there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”).
16. This is not an unusual feature of criminal procedure rights. For example, as
practiced, Batson v. Kentucky gives the criminal defendant an equal protection right to a
jury of his peers. 469 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1989). Batson, however, stems from the equal
protection right of the community to serve as jurors. Id. at 99.
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A. The Community’s Right to Decide Punishment in
Capital Cases
The history of the jury trial right illuminates it as a
collective right of the people to stand in the place of the
sovereign to impose punishment on anyone. Given that the
consequences of a determination of guilt was typically death,
“the jury trial right, for the British colonies and later the
confederation of states, was primarily about the fledgling
American community’s ability to judge its own people and
pronounce their punishment.”17 It is therefore simultaneously a
collective right of the people to judge and the individual right of
the defendant to be judged by his peers.
The influential thinkers for the Founders—Sir Edward
Coke, Matthew Hale, Cesare Beccaria, and especially William
Blackstone—wrote of the jury trial right as a public institution.18
William Blackstone explained the jury right as belonging to the
individual in the grand jury context and the community in the
petit jury context:
[T]he founders of the English laws have with excellent
forecast contrived, that no man should be called to answer
to the king for any capital crime, unless upon the
preparatory accusation of twelve or more of his fellow
subjects, the grand jury: and that the truth of every
accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment,
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by
the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours, indifferently chosen, and superior to all
suspicion.19

The jury trial was the right of the community “to guard
against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,”
and “was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in

17. Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397,
399 (2009).
18. Id. at 415-18 (dissecting the works of these thinkers to demonstrate their focus
on the right as collective not individual).
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 343 (4th
ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1770) (emphasis added).
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the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and
political liberties.”20
Further, Blackstone said, “The right of punishing belongs
not to any one individual in particular, but to the society in
general[.]”21 From the founding, the jury’s role as the sentencer
in capital cases “was unquestioned.”22 Because trials were not
bifurcated, “[t]he question of guilt and the question of death
both were decided in a single jury verdict at the end of a single
proceeding conducted as an adversarial trial.”23
In England, until 1957, murder—and over 200 other
crimes—was punishable by a mandatory sentence of death.24
Similarly in the colonies, and at the time of the founding, almost
all felonies carried the death penalty.25 Imprisonment and
degrees of murder were innovations not yet developed as
alternatives.26 Jurors exercised mercy in cases where they
20. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) (quoting 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed.
1873)); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 106 (1998) (noting the jury trial right “was not simply and always an
individual right but also an institution of localism and popular sovereignty”); Stephanos
Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia,
the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 196-97 (2005) (noting that
the original jury trial right in the Constitution “was meant to be a right of We the People to
administer justice”).
21. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 364 (emphasis added); see also Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (2013) (“Consistent with this connection between
crime and punishment, various treatises defined ‘crime’ as consisting of every fact which
‘is in law essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted,’ or the whole of the wrong ‘to
which the law affixes . . . punishment.’”).
22. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710-11 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a Capital
Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1989)).
23. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital
Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1972 (2005).
24. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976).
25. “At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791,” all of the States made
a death sentence mandatory for “a considerable number of crimes, typically including at a
minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy.” Id.
26. It was not until 1794 that Pennsylvania was successful in reforming the law,
dividing murder into degrees. Id. at 290. Nonetheless, a conviction for first-degree murder
still required imposition of a mandatory death sentence; a term of imprisonment was
imposed for second-degree murder. See id. at 290-91. Other states followed suit or kept
the old law. Either way, a jury verdict of guilty of capital murder meant an automatic death
sentence throughout the United States until the mid-1800s. Id. at 291. Beginning with
Tennessee in 1838, States began to “abandon mandatory death sentences in favor of
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believed the death penalty was too harsh by acquitting the
defendant.27 Rather than finding this an abdication of duty, this
exercise of mercy was considered a primary function of the
community. John Adams wrote, “It is not only [the juror’s]
right, but his duty . . . to find the verdict according to his own
best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct
opposition to the direction of the court.”28 Adams endorsed the
jury trial right as emanating “from the mass of the people, and
no man can be condemned of life, or limb, or property, or
reputation, without the concurrence of the voice of the people.”29
In Duncan v. Louisiana,30 hailed as the signature case
establishing a criminal defendant’s individual right to a jury
trial, the Court also underscored the fundamental right to a jury
trial as a community right: “Fear of unchecked power, so
typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or
innocence.”31 The Court explained that the jury trial came to
America with the “strong support” of the English colonists:
Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply resented.
Among the resolutions adopted by the First Congress of the
American Colonies . . . on October 19, 1765—[considered
as stating] “the most essential rights and liberties of the
colonists”—was the declaration: “That trial by jury is the
inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in
these colonies.”32

discretionary death penalty statutes.” Woodson, 428 U.S. at 291. By 1920, approximately
40 states had made death sentences discretionary for first-degree murder and other capital
offenses. Id.
27. As the Court explained in Woodson, “At least since the Revolution, American
jurors have, with some regularity, disregarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants
where a death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict.” 428 U.S. at
293.
28. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 255 (Charles Francis Adams, ed.,
Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1865).
29. Id. at 253.
30. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. Id. at 156.
32. Id.
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Further, the Duncan Court recounted, the First Continental
Congress, in the resolve of October 14, 1774, objected to trials
before judges dependent upon the Crown alone for their salaries
and to trials in England for alleged crimes committed in the
colonies; the Congress therefore declared “[t]hat the respective
colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and more
especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.”33
The Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress, held in
Philadelphia, September 5, 1774, mimicked Blackstone’s
description of the jury trial right as the collective right of the
people and the individual right of the accused:
The next great right is that of trial by jury. This provides,
that neither life, liberty nor property can be taken from the
possessor, until twelve of his unexceptional countrymen
and peers, of his vicinage, who from that neighbourhood
may reasonably be supposed to be acquainted with his
character, and the characters of the witnesses, upon a fair
trial, and full enquiry face to face, in open Court, before as
many of the people as chuse [sic] to attend, shall pass their
sentence upon oath against him . . . .34

After a thorough review of this history, Laura Appleman
concludes, “[T]he Continental Congress thought it important to
not only mention trial by jury, but also to explain that this jury
trial right was public, expressive, and local . . . . Popular
understanding of the jury trial right would have unquestionably
seen it as a right of the community, no matter where or how it
was inserted into the Constitution.”35
33. Id.
34. Appleman, supra note 17, at 421-22 (quoting U.S. CONT’L CONG., JOURNAL OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS, HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, SEPTEMBER 5, 1774, at
121 (1774)); see also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2161 (2013) (“It also
preserves the historic role of the jury as an intermediary between the State and criminal
defendants.”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (“[T]he essential feature of a
jury obviously lies in [its] interposition between the accused and his accuser.”); see supra
note 14, 20 and accompanying text.
35. Appleman, supra note 17, at 426, 438. Justice White for the Court in Duncan
also underscored the collectivity of the right:
[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to
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When death was on the table, the community was entitled
to interpose itself, in the form of a jury, between the accused and
the sovereign.36 As the next section demonstrates, this was the
case for hundreds of years, beginning in the thirteenth century.37

B. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt as the Moral
Conscience of the Community
As with the right to a jury trial, the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard has both a collective and individual aspect. The
modern rationale for the standard bears little relation to its
history, but this is not to say either need be jettisoned. They can
be reconciled. The modern rationale was expressed in 1970 in
In re Winship,38 where the Court held that the requirement that
the prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was a
requirement of the Constitution under the Due Process Clause.39
The Court expressed this due process right as inuring to the
benefit of the criminal defendant. The “reasonable doubt”
requirement “has [a] vital role in our criminal procedure for
cogent reasons.”40 The prosecution subjects the criminal
defendant both to “the possibility that he may lose his liberty
upon conviction and . . . the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction.”41 This procedural protection
entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or
to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and
Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law
in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt
or innocence. The deep commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in
serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement
qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and must therefore be respected by the States.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
36. See White, supra note 22, at 10 (“[B]y the time [of] the Bill of Rights . . . the
jury’s role in finding facts that would determine a homicide defendant’s eligibility for
capital punishment was particularly well established.”).
37. To have one jurist put a man to death, as was the case in Alabama until 2017, see
infra note 109, and is currently the case in Montana, see infra note 109, was simply
unthinkable for hundreds of years both before and after the founding of our nation.
38. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39. Id. at 364.
40. Id. at 363.
41. Id.

276

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:267

“provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence”42 and reduces the risk of erroneous convictions.
However, the Court also expressed a shade of the history of
the reasonable doubt rule when it described it as essential to
ensure only the guilty are “condemned”:
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in
applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are
being condemned.43

Going back in time, we see that it is the “moral force” of
the standard in protecting the community that brought it about.
The “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard emerged into
use in the eighteenth century as the product of a history of
Christian juries fearful of the moral consequences of returning
guilty verdicts.44 Along with the requirement of a unanimous
verdict of twelve jurors, it was a “moral comfort” rule, not a
guide to fact finding.45 When it first appeared in the Boston
Massacre trial in Robert Paine’s closing argument in 1770, its
use was meant to ease the jurors’ path to conviction.46
The origin of the jury trial itself, as a replacement to
decision-making by judges, was tied to the anxieties of judges in
returning guilty verdicts in cases of blood punishments and
death. If perchance a judge convicted an innocent man, it was a
mortal sin in the older Christian tradition.47 Because of the
judicial discomfit, by the thirteenth century, England had
developed the criminal jury trial as we know it today.48 Now it
42. Id. The Court in Jackson v. Virginia described the reasonable doubt standard in
similar terms: “[B]y impressing upon the factfinder the need to reach a subjective state of
near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our
society attaches to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.” 443 U.S. 307, 315
(1979).
43. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
44. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL
ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 3 (2008).
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. at 193.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id. at 138.

2017] DEATH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

277

was to be jurors, not judges, who had to bear the potential moral
consequences of sitting in judgment in blood cases.
By the end of the Middle Ages, jurors found some salvation
in the “special verdict,” where they could find facts only and
leave the judgment to the judge.49 As explained by legal
historian James Whitman:
Death and doubt: these were the great issues. Sir Edward
Coke too cited the same doctrine at the end of the century.
For him too the need for special verdicts arose in cases
where the jury experienced doubt: “[N]ote, reader, in all
cases where the jurors find the special matter doubtful in
law pertinent and tending to the issue which they are to try,
there the Court ought to accept it.” Death and doubt
presented the great challenges for the criminal jury.50

In the seventeenth century, jurors lost the right to a special
verdict and then regained it and, similarly, lost and regained the
relief of the benefit of clergy (which assignment allowed the
accused to escape punishment).51 Additionally, jurors had the
option of transporting the condemned to the colonies as another
method to escape the moral stain of blood punishments.52
However, that option came to an end with the American
Revolution.53
Without the option of transportation, jurors in the 1780s
understandably often refused to find guilt in cases of blood
punishment and death, believing they themselves faced potential
damnation.54 Theological tracts and moral philosophers in the
eighteenth century emphasized in cases of any doubt, jurors
should take the “safer side” or the “safer path.”55 Hence, jurors
acquitted.56 Because execution was the usual punishment and

49. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 157.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 162.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 187.
54. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 187; see also id. at 174 (noting the “safer path”
doctrine, including in Sir Matthew Hale’s HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736),
where he writes “[W]hen you are in doubt, do not act, especially in Cases of Life”).
55. Id. at 199.
56. Id. at 199, 200.
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transportation to the colonies was not an alternative, the moral
concerns of the jurors did not dissipate by the eighteenth
century, even though blood punishments were rare. James
Whitman posits we may not have seen the emergence of
reasonable doubt if execution were not the usual punishment.57
Reasonable doubt as a moral concept, making its debut in
England in the 1780s, was a response to the “timidity” of jurors
who experienced “a general dread lest the charge of innocent
blood should lie at their doors.”58 Jurors so instructed, could
convict if they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, as
opposed to all doubt:59
[The theology of reasonable doubt] was designed to quell
fears about the responsibility for judgment, not to resolve
factual mysteries. It was designed to coax jurors into
acting, in situations in which they felt uneasy about the
“perilous” task of condemning others.60

Importantly, the moral focus was not on the finding of
facts, which had always been more of a given than they are
57. Id. at 187.
58. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 4.
59. For a time, the phrasing of the matter of proof in moral evidence was beyond any
doubt. See Barbara J. Shapiro, “To a Moral Certainty”: Theories of Knowledge and
Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 179-80 (1986) (“It was the
‘indispensable duty’ of the judges in charging the jury to ask ‘whether they are satisfied,
beyond the probability of doubt, that the defendant is guilty.’”); see also S. PHILLIPS,
THEORY OF PRESUMPTIVE PROOF 58 (1814) (stating “that the ‘impression in the mind of a
jury in a criminal case’ must not be ‘that the prisoner is probably guilty, but that he really
and absolutely is so.’ If the jury had doubts, they were to acquit.”); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO,
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 33 (1991) (“Moral evidence was to be
distinguished from demonstration, which led to absolute certainty, for the proofs involved
in moral evidence were fallible. They, therefore, could not produce absolute certainty but
only ‘probable judgment, or at most moral certainty.’ Probability, however, might ‘rise so
high, as to exclude all reasonable doubt.’”).
60. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 204. Erik Lillquist agrees that “[i]t seems likely
that the rise of the reasonable doubt standard was related to the increasing resistance of the
public—both American and British—to the application of the capital sanction.” Erik
Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 51 (2005).
See also Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of
Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 148-49, 149 n.206-07 (2002) (giving views of
nineteenth-century commentators); Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable
Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of
Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 1195 (2003) (“[T]he early life of the reasonabledoubt instruction appears to [have been] limited solely to capital trials . . . .”).
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today, but on the morality of punishment.61 As eloquently put
by James Whitman, “There is nothing in that phrase [reasonable
doubt] that tells us how to go about determining uncertain facts
in any rational or scientific way. The phrase tells us a great
deal, though, about how to feel easy in our consciences when we
condemn others.”62
By the end of the eighteenth century the concepts of moral
certainty and proof beyond reasonable doubt were interwoven in
the treatises and literature.63 There is little debate among
scholars that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was equated with
moral certainty.64 Because trials were not based on scientific,
demonstrable proof, but witness reports (called “moral
evidence”), moral certainty was “the highest degree of certitude
based on such evidence.”65 If one had real doubts, moral
certainty was not reached.66 “At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, proof beyond all reasonable doubt was the most popular
version [of the standard].”67 Instructions to jurors were guides to
61. WHITMAN, supra note 44, at 209.
62. Id. at 204.
63. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 185 (explaining how Thomas Starkie’s Practical
Treatise on the Law of Evidence was influential into the nineteenth century and reflected
the modern standard; it said, “Evidence which satisfies the minds of the jury of the truth of
the fact in dispute, to the entire exclusion of every reasonable doubt, constitutes full proof
of the fact.” (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(2d ed. London 1833)).
64. See Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases:
Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 111 (1999); Shapiro, supra
note 59, at 170-71.
65. Solan, supra note 64, at 111; see also Shapiro, supra note 59, at 175 (“The
addition of the concept of moral certainty reflected the desire to make legal language
consistent with the philosophical terminology of the day. This terminology, however
foreign to modern ears, was part of the language and discourse of the educated classes in
both England and America. ‘Satisfied conscience,’ ‘reasonable doubt,’ and ‘moral
certainty’ were widely used concepts, and these and related terms were to be found in
moral, theological, historical, and philosophical as well as legal discourse.”).
66. See Shapiro, supra note 59, at 177 (“John Morgan’s 1789 Essay Upon the Law of
Evidence similarly relied on a Lockean conception of knowledge . . . [He said that] [t]he
mind ‘ought not any longer to doubt but, to be nearly if not as perfectly well-satisfied as if
we of ourselves knew the fact.’ Morgan’s ‘satisfaction’ was also synonymous with judicial
demands for jury ‘satisfaction’ or ‘satisfied conscience.’ Jury verdicts must be based on
the very highest knowledge available to man in matters of fact.”).
67. Solan, supra note 64, at 110 n.23. As Barbara Shapiro uncovers, Simon
Greenleaf’s Treatise on the Law of Evidence, “a famous nineteenth-century American
treatise,” explained it in a manner that comes closest to more modern jury instructions:
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moral persuasion and satisfaction and not intended to do the
work of “finding facts.”68
The next section describes the Court’s own efforts at
describing and filling out a jury trial right, with its attendant
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, using a historical
analysis. While its interpretation of the history expands the
application of the jury trial right, its goals have been limited in
the capital context, and its historical unearthing incomplete.
This Article will demonstrate there is room and intention for this
doctrine to expand further in the penalty phase of a capital trial.

II. THE SUPREME COURT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE PRE-HURST
A. Non-Capital Application from Apprendi to Alleyne
Since the year 2000,69 the Court has been on a steady path
to define and expand the parameters of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial consistent with its understanding of the right
at the time of this nation’s founding. The intention of the Court
has not been to contract, expand, or change the right but to
Matters of fact are proved by moral evidence alone; by which is meant, not
only that kind of evidence, which is employed on subjects connected with
moral conduct, but all the evidence, which is not obtained either from
intuition, or from demonstration. In the ordinary affairs of life, we do not
require demonstrative evidence . . . and to insist upon it would be
unreasonable and absurd. The most that can be affirmed of such things is,
that there is no reasonable doubt concerning them . . . . By satisfactory
evidence . . . is intended that amount of proof, which ordinarily satisfies an
unprejudiced mind beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances, which will
amount to this degree of proof, can never be previously defined; the only
legal test of which they are susceptible, is their sufficiency to satisfy the mind
and conscience of a common man, and so to convince them, that he would
venture to act upon that conviction, in the matters of the highest concern and
importance to his own interest.
Shapiro, supra note 59, at 189 (quoting SIMON GREENLEAF, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 4-5 (2d ed. Boston 1844)).
68. Shapiro, supra note 59, at 155-56.
69. The effort started a year earlier in Jones v. United States, where the Court noted
that “under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
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interpret its application properly according to its roots. The
result has been its steady expansion into realms not in existence
at the time of the founders.
The watershed case in this interpretative effort is Apprendi
v. New Jersey.70 New Jersey’s statute had authorized a trial
judge, after a guilty verdict, to impose an extended term of
imprisonment if she found that the crime was, in essence, a
“hate crime.”71 The judge so found in Apprendi’s case.72 In
reversing that enhanced portion of the sentence, the Court held
that:
[The procedure violated two] constitutional protections of
surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation
of liberty without “due process of law,” and the guarantee
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”
Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal
defendant to “a jury determination that [he] is guilty of
every element of the crime with which he is charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt.”73

The Court incorporated the history of the jury trial “as the
great bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties,”74 quoting
Blackstone on the importance of judgment by members of the
community75 and finding it in the company of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.76 Relying on the time period of our nation’s
founding, the Court wrote that there was no known “distinction
70. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
71. Id. at 468-69.
72. Id. at 471.
73. Id. at 476-77.
74. Id. at 477 (quoting STORY, supra note 20, at 540-541).
75. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (noting that “trial by jury has been understood to
require that ‘the truth of every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment,
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of
twelve of [the defendant’s] equals and neighbours . . . .’”) (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 478 (stating that simultaneously, and “[e]qually well founded is the
companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
‘demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed
from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula “beyond a reasonable
doubt” seems to have occurred as late as 1798.’”). Note that according to James Whitman,
the Court gets this wrong: as has been discussed, jurors had been using a higher standard
of no doubt and “reasonable doubt” was brought into play to allay their moral fears about
convicting an innocent man. Whitman, supra note 44, at 193-94.
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between an ‘element’ of a felony offense and a ‘sentencing
factor’” in any criminal proceeding.77 Recognizing unitary trials
were the norm, the Court said, “The defendant’s ability to
predict with certainty the judgment from the face of the felony
indictment flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment
with crime.”78 A finding of guilt by the jury dictated the
sentence the judge would pronounce.79
Therefore, the Court held that regardless of New Jersey’s
claim that the hate crime enhancement was a “sentencing factor”
for the judge’s determination and not an “element” of the crime,
“the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the
required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment
than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”80 The Court
easily held that answer was yes in Apprendi, holding that
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.”81 It is this last phrasing that became the
clarion call for future cases.
In Blakely v. Washington,82 an extension of Apprendi that
invalidated much of Washington’s sentencing guidelines,83

77. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478.
78. Id. at 478-79 (“[A]fter verdict, and barring a defect in the indictment, pardon, or
benefit of clergy, ‘the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to
the crime’” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 369-70 (1769) (emphasis added by Court)). A jury proceeded upon “an
indictment containing ‘all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offence . . .
stated with such certainty and precision, that the defendant . . . may be enabled to
determine the species of offence they constitute, in order that he may prepare his defence
accordingly . . . and that there may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given,
if the defendant be convicted.’” Id. at 478 (quoting JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD,
PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862) (emphasis added by
Court)).
79. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
80. Id. at 494; see also id. at 484 (“If a defendant faces punishment beyond that
provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not
others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are
heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not—at the moment the State is
put to proof of those circumstances—be deprived of protections that have, until that point,
unquestionably attached.”).
81. Id. at 490.
82. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, “[T]he relevant ‘statutory
maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose
after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose
without any additional findings.”84 This re-phrasing of the
holding is critical when considering the penalty phase of a
capital case. As will be discussed more fully below, most jurists
make the mistake of thinking the jury trial guarantee is fulfilled
once a defendant is found “death eligible,” typically defined as
once an aggravating factor is found. But that finding is only one
of the findings that must be made before the maximum penalty
of death may be imposed.85
While there are more cases in the Court’s Apprendi line in
the non-capital arena,86 Alleyne v. United States87 is noteworthy
because it demonstrates the Court’s devotion to Apprendi’s
expansive meaning, regardless of the cost. In Alleyne, the Court
overruled its own post-Apprendi opinion to find that any fact
that increases mandatory minimum sentence for crime is an
element of the crime that must be submitted to a jury and found
beyond a reasonable doubt.88 Overturning Harris v. United
States,89 the Court clarified that it meant what it said when it said
83. See id. at 305. Blakely foreshadowed the ultimate invalidation of much of the
federal sentencing guidelines by the Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
84. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-304.
85. As applied to a capital case, John Douglass observed that a defendant cannot be
sentenced to death upon finding of the alleged aggravating factor or factors alone, unless
that is all that is presented at sentencing. Douglass, supra note 23, at 2004-05. Rather,
“[a]fter Furman, Woodson, and Lockett v. Ohio, no death sentence can ever be imposed
even on a death-eligible defendant until the sentencer considers ‘any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.’” Id. John Douglass has
pointed out the gamesmanship that can emerge from distinguishing “eligibility”
aggravating factors that are charged in the indictment by the prosecution, and therefore
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, from other aggravating evidence not officially
charged. Id. at 2001-2002. For example, the prosecutor could list “pecuniary gain” as the
sole statutory aggravator that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but nonetheless
put on evidence that the defendant used torturous means, not subject to such any standard
of proof for the jury. Id.
86. See, e.g., Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2348-49 (2012);
Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 860 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 226-27 (2005).
87. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
88. Id. at 2155.
89. 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
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in Apprendi that the question is “one not of form, but of
effect.”90 The jury must make the finding, whether it is one that
increases the minimum or the maximum. Alleyne represents the
Court’s willingness to upend years of practice and its own
supporting precedents in its stolid devotion to the jury trial right.

B. Apprendi in the Capital Penalty Phase: Ring v.
Arizona
Falling directly in line with the holding of Apprendi, the
Court did not balk in applying it to the penalty phase of a capital
case. In Ring v. Arizona,91 the Court invalidated the procedure
in Arizona whereby, following a jury adjudication of a
defendant’s guilt of first-degree murder, the trial judge, sitting
alone, determined the presence or absence of aggravating
factors, at least one of which was required by Arizona law to
make a defendant eligible for the death penalty.92 Instead,
applying Apprendi’s holding, the Court held that “the required
finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a
greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty
verdict”93 and therefore had to be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.94
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia, writing separately to note
his own personal conundrum with the Eighth Amendment
edifice the Court had built post-Furman, but endorsing a robust
Sixth Amendment analysis, famously stated that findings
“essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the
defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of

90. 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
91. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
92. Id. at 592-93 (“At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the judge is to
determine the presence or absence of the enumerated ‘aggravating circumstances’ and any
‘mitigating circumstances.’ The State’s law authorizes the judge to sentence the defendant
to death only if there is at least one aggravating circumstance and ‘there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.’”).
93. Id. at 604.
94. Arizona’s statute already included the requirement, so the issue in Ring was
whether a judge could make this finding. Id. at 597. Justice Scalia in concurrence
explicitly stated the aggravating factors “must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable
doubt” under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”95 Although unhappy with
the requirement of aggravating factors, he nonetheless agreed
that they must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.96
In strong terms, he stated:
[O]ur people’s traditional belief in the right of trial by
jury is in perilous decline. That decline is bound to be
confirmed, and indeed accelerated, by the repeated
spectacle of a man’s going to his death because a judge
found that an aggravating factor existed. We cannot
preserve our veneration for the protection of the jury in
criminal cases if we render ourselves callous to the need for
that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty
without it.97

This position represents a strong signal that the Sixth
Amendment may have more pedigree to guide juries in
imposing death than the Eighth Amendment.98
The Court was keen to note that the question presented in
Ring was “tightly delineated”;99 the defendant “contend[ed] only
that the Sixth Amendment required jury findings on the
aggravating circumstances against him.”100 The Court noted,
“He makes no Sixth Amendment claim with respect to the
mitigating circumstances. Nor does he argue that the Sixth
Amendment required the jury to make the ultimate
determination whether to impose the death penalty.”101 The
95. Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. In his view, the edifice of aggravating circumstances in statutes, built by states
largely in response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and subsequent Supreme
Court case law, is not required under the Constitution. See id. Yet, once built, his devotion
to the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial requirement commands the result in Ring. Id. at 612.
97. Id. Note that Justice Scalia stated his belief that a judge in Arizona could still
make the ultimate life or death decision once the jury had found an aggravating factor. Id.
This Article’s point is to demonstrate that history and logical progression of the Court’s
case law command that a jury make this decision.
98. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring). In Ring, Justice Breyer did
not join the opinion but concurred in the result believing that the Eighth Amendment, and
not the Sixth Amendment, requires jury sentencing in capital cases. Id.
99. Id. at 597 n.4.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1976), an Eighth Amendment
case where a plurality of the Court said, “[I]t has never [been] suggested that jury
sentencing is constitutionally required.”).
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Court was also not presented with the question of whether the
finding that aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors
was a finding that increased the maximum punishment that
could be imposed and therefore needed to be made by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
This noted reference to the narrowness of the question
presented foreshadowed the Court’s more expanded discussion
of the factfinding in capital cases that should fall in line in Hurst
v. Florida.102 Indeed the Court closes its opinion in Ring with
the broad statement, “The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it
encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant’s
sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put
him to death.”103

III. HURST V. FLORIDA
Hurst v. Florida104 sets a course for an expanded jury trial
right in capital cases, one that is true to its origins. Reading
Justice Sotomayor’s words, for seven members of the Court,
leaves little doubt that the Court is laying down tracks. The
logical progression after Hurst is to demand that all findings—
whether in the form of weighing or not—required for imposition
of death, including the finding that death is the appropriate
punishment, be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, to understand the potential impact of Hurst and its logical
extension, we need a snapshot of the statutory schemes in place
for capital punishment before the Court decided the case.

A. The Lay of the Land Pre-Hurst
Of those thirty-two jurisdictions that have the death
penalty,105 the map of the use of the beyond a reasonable doubt
102. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
103. 536 U.S. at 609.
104. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
105. Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and the United
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standard at any point in the penalty process is a patchwork. In
nine “weighing” states, jurors must use a reasonable doubt
standard at the weighing stage: either they must find that the
aggravating
circumstances
outweigh
the
mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before they are
authorized to impose the death penalty or they must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any mitigating
circumstances
did
not
outweigh
the
aggravating
circumstances.106 Of those nine states, Utah also requires
additionally that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard be
applied to the ultimate decision:
The death penalty shall only be imposed if, after
considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable
doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and
is further persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate
in the circumstances.107

Similarly, but not as broadly, in Washington, a “nonweighing” state, the trial court instructs the jury “to deliberate
upon the following question: ‘Having in mind the crime of
which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient
mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?’”108
On the other hand, there is the possibility of completely
eschewing a jury trial right: before Hurst four states allowed the

States Government. See States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty
[https://perma.cc/MGB5-4H6F].
106. For Arkansas, see ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-4-603(a) (2013). For Colorado, see
Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003) (en banc); People v. Tenneson, 788 P.2d
786, 792 (Colo. 1990) (en banc). For Kansas, see PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KANSAS
CRIMINAL 54.060 (4th ed.) (West 2016). For Missouri, see State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d
253, 256-63 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). For North Carolina, see N.C.P.I.-CRIM. 150.10 for jury
instructions. For Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(2) (West 2017) (proposed
legislation). For Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(g)(1) (West 2014). For
Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (5)(b) (West 2016); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71,
83-84 (Utah 1982)). For Wyoming, see Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 590 (Wyo. 2003).
107. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (5)(b) (West 2016) (emphasis added).
108. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.060(4) (West 2016).
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judge to usurp the jury’s decision-making, whether by calling
the jury’s decision merely advisory, allowing a judicial override,
or by making the decision alone.109 In addition, ten “weighing”
jurisdictions (nine states and the federal government) use
language that jury findings of aggravating factors must
“outweigh” or “sufficiently outweigh” mitigating circumstances,
but with no standard for the weighing.110 Five more states do
109. For Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1) (2017) (proposed
legislation) (“When a defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense for which the
sentence of death may be imposed, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the
guilty plea was entered shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the
existence or nonexistence of the circumstances set forth in 46-18-303 and 46-18-304 for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing must be conducted
before the court alone.”). Alabama allowed for a judicial override of a jury’s
recommendation of life until 2017, when the legislature finally eliminated judicial override.
See Alabama Ends Death Penalty by Judicial Override, USNEWS, (Apr. 11, 2017,
6:30PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/alabama/articles/2017-04-11/alabamaends-death-penalty-by-judicial-override [https://perma.cc/2JF8-2Z74]; Ala. Code. 1975 §
13A-5-47(a) (2017). Florida’s scheme was struck down by the Hurst decision. See 136 S.
Ct. 616, 616-18 (2016). Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court held its state scheme
unconstitutional after Hurst in Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433-34 (Del. 2016).
110. For Arizona, see State v. Glassel, 116 P.3d 1193, 1218-19 (Ariz. 2005) (en
banc) (finding Arizona’s death penalty scheme constitutional even though it provides “no
objective standards to guide the jury in weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances”). For California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 2003) (“[T]he trier
of fact . . . shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.”) (emphasis added).
For Idaho, see State v. Payne, 199 P.3d 123, 154 (Idaho 2008) (“[T]he jury is to . . .
conduct the weighing process of aggravating and mitigating factors to determine if the
defendant should be sentenced to death.”). For Indiana, see IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(1)
(West 2016) (proposed legislation) (“Before a sentence may be imposed under this section,
the jury . . . must find that . . . any mitigating circumstances that exists are outweighed by
the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.”) (emphasis added). For Mississippi, see
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(2) (West 2017) (proposed legislation) (“the jury shall
deliberate . . . [as to w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist . . . which outweigh
the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and . . . [b]ased on these considerations,
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment, life imprisonment without
eligibility for parole, or death”) (emphasis added). For Nevada, see NEV. REV. STAT. §
175.554(3) (2016) (a jury “may impose a sentence of death only if it finds . . . that there are
no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or
circumstances found”) (emphasis added). For New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5(IV) (2016) (“The jury shall consider . . . whether the aggravating factors found to
exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist . . . Based upon
this consideration, if the jury concludes that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors . . . the jury . . . may recommend that a sentence of death be imposed.”) (emphasis
added). For Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 701.11 (2016) (“Unless . . . it is
found that any . . . aggravating circumstance is outweighed by the finding of one or more
mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed.”) (emphasis added). For
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not require weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances but, in various forms, have the jury more or less
consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
decide whether to impose death, again without any standard for
making their decision.111 Three additional states do not require
weighing but require the jury to answer certain questions—such
as whether the defendant is a future danger—before imposing
the death penalty.112
Pennsylvania, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (2016) (proposed legislation) (“The
verdict must be a sentence of death . . . if the jury unanimously finds one or more
aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances.”) (emphasis
added). For the U.S. Government, see 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e)(3) (2012) (“[T]he jury . . . shall
consider whether all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh
all of the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence of death”)
(emphasis added). Additionally, as of 2017, after the Alabama legislature eliminated the
power of the judge to override a jury’s sentence to life, see supra note 109, Alabama is a
weighing state. See Ala. Code. 1975 § 13A-5-46 (e) (2017) (“[I]f the jury determines that
one or more aggravating circumstances . . . exist and that they outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, if any, it shall return a verdict of death.”).
111. For Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(a) (West 2016) (“Where . . . a
person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death
shall not be imposed unless the jury verdict includes a finding of at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance and a recommendation that such sentence be imposed. Where a
statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the
court shall sentence the accused to death.”). For Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
532.025(1)(b) (proposed legislation) (“[T]he jury shall . . . determine whether any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances . . . exist and [shall] recommend a sentence for the
defendant.”). For Louisiana, see LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.3 (2016) (“A
sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after consideration of any
mitigating circumstances, determines that the sentence of death should be imposed.”). For
South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (proposed legislation) (“In the
[sentencing] proceeding, if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant
must be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment . . . In the sentencing proceeding,
the jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation
of the punishment.”); Smith v. Moore, 137 F.3d 808, 815 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that South
Carolina is a non-weighing state)). For South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A27A-1 (2016) (“[I]n all cases for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge
shall consider, or shall include in instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating
circumstances and any . . . aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the
evidence.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (2016) (“If, upon a trial by jury, a person
is convicted of a Class A felony, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury
verdict at the presentence hearing includes a finding of at least one aggravating
circumstance and a recommendation that such sentence be imposed.”).
112. For Oregon, see OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B), (d) (2017). For Texas, see
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b), (c) (West 2015). For Virginia, see VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(C) (West 2016). Oregon and Texas, under the provisions noted
here, both require the jury to determine whether there is a probability the defendant will
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The courts that explicitly considered the application of
Apprendi and Ring to the weighing decision were also divided
(leading to some of the divisions just described). Five state
supreme courts held that Apprendi applied to the weighing
determination, i.e., that a jury must find that the aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt before it can impose the death penalty.113
On the other hand, ten state courts and four federal circuits
held that Apprendi is inapplicable to the weighing process.
Some courts clung to the limits of Ring’s narrow holding as
applying only to the finding of aggravating factors.114 Most
reasoned that the weighing process was not a fact-finding one,115
commit criminal acts making him a future danger, and must decide this probability
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” but this conflation of two standards—probability and
“beyond a reasonable doubt” presents its own problems. See infra notes 174-77 and
accompanying text.
113. Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256, 265 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (finding a jury—
rather than a three-judge panel—must “be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any
mitigating factors did not outweigh the proven statutory aggravating factors.”); State v.
Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 410 (Conn. 2003) (finding “the jury must be instructed that it must be
persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
factors and that, therefore, it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the
appropriate punishment in this case”); Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 433-34 (Del. 2016)
(holding statute unconstitutional where judge, not jury, weighs aggravators and mitigating
circumstances and fails to require that aggravators outweigh mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 261-62 (Mo. 2003) (en
banc) (reasoning that the finding that the aggravators outweigh the mitigating
circumstances is a finding of fact under Ring); Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 590 (Wyo.
2003) (“If the jury is to be instructed to ‘weigh,’ . . . the burden of negating this mitigating
evidence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the State.”). See also
McLaughlin v. Steele, 173 F. Supp. 3d 855, 896 (E.D. Mo. 2016) (granting habeas relief
where jury did not unanimously find mitigating evidence failed to outweigh aggravating
factors, a finding of fact and therefore a violation of Ring).
114. See, e.g., People v. Ballard, 794 N.E.2d 788, 821 (Ill. 2002) (noting Ballard’s
“complaint concern[ed] mitigating, not aggravating, factors” and though it was bound by
this Court’s precedents, it was “not bound to extend the decisions . . .”).
115. United States v. Gabrion, 719 F.3d 511, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The result [of
weighing] is one of judgment, of shades of gray . . . the judgment is . . . not a finding of
fact, but a moral judgment”); United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 32 (1st Cir. 2007)
(“the requisite weighing [provision of the Federal Death Penalty Act] constitutes a process,
not a fact to be found”); People v. Prieto, 66 P.3d 1123, 1155 (Cal. 2003) (“[Because] the
penalty phase determination in California is normative, not factual,” the jury need not find
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt); Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1151-52 (Md. 2003) (“[T]he weighing process is not
a fact-finding one based on evidence”); Com v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351, 360 (Pa. 2005)
(“[B]ecause the weighing of the evidence is a function distinct from fact-finding, Apprendi
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but something else: a “normative one,”116 or “a moral or legal
judgment.”117 Others reasoned that the weighing process does
not increase the maximum punishment.118 As we will see, these
protestations have little merit.119
The bottom line is a deep division in the states as to the role
and placement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. In
Hurst v. Florida, the Court signaled trouble for those states that
do not apply the standard to all factual findings required for
imposition of a death sentence, all of which must be found by a
jury, not a judge.

does not apply here.”); State v. Fry, 126 P.3d 516, 534 (N.M. 2005) (“[T]he balancing
process is not ‘a fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is
charged’ such that it would invoke the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt”); State v. Longo, 148 P.3d 892, 906 (Or. 2006) (holding that the
weighing “does not involve any determination of fact”).
116. People v. Merriman, 332 P.3d 1187, 1265 (Cal. 2014) (“[D]etermining the
balance of evidence of aggravation and mitigation and the appropriate penalty do not entail
the finding of facts but rather a single fundamentally normative assessment . . . that is
outside the scope of Ring and Apprendi.”).
117. Ex parte Waldrop, 859 So. 2d 1181, 1189 (Ala. 2002) (“[T]he weighing process
is not a factual determination . . . [but] instead, it is a moral or legal judgment that takes
into account a theoretically limitless set of facts and that cannot be reduced to a scientific
formula or the discovery of a discrete, observable datum.”); Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d
235, 251 (Nev. 2011) (overruling previous decision that held weighing to be a factual
determination because it is instead a moral judgment); Ohio v. Belton, No. 2012-0902,
2016 WL 1592786, at *9 (Ohio Apr. 20, 2016) (finding that the weighing process “is not a
fact-finding process subject to the Sixth Amendment” but that it “amounts to a complex
moral judgment about what penalty to impose upon a defendant who is already deathpenalty eligible”); see also United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 346 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he jury’s decision that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors is not a
finding of fact [but rather] it is a ‘highly subjective,’ ‘largely moral judgment’ ‘regarding
the punishment that a particular person deserves . . .’”); United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d
1079, 1107-08 (10th Cir. 2007) (following the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Fields).
118. Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. 2004) (“The outcome of weighing
does not increase eligibility . . . [and] is therefore not required to be found by a jury under a
reasonable doubt standard.”). But see id. at 273 (Rucker, J., dissenting in part, concurring
in part) (“The plain language of Indiana’s capital sentencing scheme makes death
eligibility contingent upon certain findings that must be weighed by the jury . . . [T]hey are
at a minimum the type of findings anticipated by Apprendi and Ring and thus require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Gales, 658 N.W.2d 604, 626-27 (Neb. 2003)
(“These [weighing] determinations cannot increase the potential punishment to which a
defendant is exposed as a consequence of the eligibility determination.”); Torres v. State,
58 P.3d 214, 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (“It is [the aggravating factor] finding, not the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, that authorizes jurors to consider
imposing a sentence of death.”).
119. See infra notes 142-182 and accompanying text.
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B. Hurst v. Florida
In 2016, the Court decided Hurst v. Florida120 and struck
down Florida’s capital penalty scheme for violating Hurst’s right
to a jury trial.121 Its strict holding is a narrow one—a simple
application of Ring to Florida’s scheme. However, Justice
Sotomayor chose to use language signaling a larger problem
with many more state schemes’ compliance with the right to a
jury and findings beyond a reasonable doubt, such that Florida,
for one, chose to honor that signaling on remand, at least in part.
Florida was (and still is) a “weighing state,” where the
scheme was that the sentencer had to find that an aggravating
factor existed beyond a reasonable doubt per Ring, and then had
to find that any aggravating factor or factors outweighed any
mitigating circumstances before death could be imposed.122 The
jury gave only an advisory verdict, and the judge could ignore it
completely, deciding aggravating factors and mitigating
circumstances, their weight, and the sentence.123 The narrow
question presented by the appellant in Hurst was, per Ring,
whether a jury, rather than a judge, must find aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.124 Justice Sotomayor
gave that a one sentence “yes” at the end of her discussion for
the Court.125 But that narrow, one-sentence conclusion was
eclipsed by her broader discussion.
For seven members of the Court, Justice Sotomayor
consistently repeated and emphasized that “[t]he Sixth
Amendment requires a jury, not a judge, to find each fact
necessary to impose a sentence of death.”126 She did not use

120. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
121. Id. at 619.
122. Id. at 620.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 621.
125. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 624 (“Florida’s sentencing scheme, which required the
judge alone to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance, is therefore
unconstitutional.”). The Court overruled Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and
Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989), in that they held that the Sixth Amendment did
not require that findings authorizing the death penalty be made by a jury. Hurst, 136 S. Ct.
at 623 (expressly overruling cases “in relevant part”).
126. Id. at 619.
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only the words “aggravating factors,” but instead used the words
“findings” or “factual findings.”127 In condemning Florida’s
scheme, she wrote, “Florida does not require the jury to make
the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.”128
She quoted the statute: “Notwithstanding the recommendation
of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence
of life imprisonment or death.”129 Further, if the court imposes
death, it must “set forth in writing its findings upon which the
sentence of death is based.”130 “The trial court alone must find
the facts . . . ‘[t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist’
and ‘[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to
outweigh the aggravating circumstances.’”131
Indicating that the weighing decision was part of the
“findings” that a jury must find, she quoted Walton v. Arizona:
It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence,
but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to
the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge. A
Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s
findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does
a trial judge in Arizona.132

We can assume the Justice chose her words carefully133 and
that the six Justices joining the opinion would have balked at the
127. Id. at 622.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 620 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)) (emphasis added).
130. Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (2017))
(emphasis added).
131. Id. at 622 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3)) (emphasis on “alone” in
original; remaining emphasis added).
132. Id. at 622 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
133. Her language is fully consistent with her dissenting opinion from denial of
certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 405 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
At the time of the opinion, until new legislation passed in 2017, see supra note 109,
Alabama allowed a judge to override a jury’s decision on the sentence. Id. at 406. There,
she condemned the scheme and wrote that the “required finding that the aggravating factors
of a defendant’s crime outweigh the mitigating factors . . . is necessary to impose the death
penalty.” Id. at 410-11. This parallels her language that “Florida does not require the jury
to make the critical findings necessary to impose the death penalty.” Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at
622.
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broadness of the “factual findings” language if they did not
agree with the signaling effect of this dictum. The next domino
to fall in line, if presented to the Court, would be an application
of the reasonable doubt standard to a jury’s decision that
aggravators outweigh mitigating circumstances.

C. Kansas v. Carr Does Not Derail Hurst’s Sixth
Amendment Train
In the same term as Hurst, an opinion that Justice Scalia
joined, Justice Scalia penned an opinion in Kansas v. Carr,134
where he held for eight members of the Court (with Justice
Sotomayor dissenting) that the Eighth Amendment did not
require that the jury be instructed that mitigating circumstances
need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.135 Lest there be
any confusion that Hurst cannot be reconciled with Carr, it must
be emphasized that Carr is not a Sixth Amendment case and, in
fact, what it does say about the Sixth Amendment is consistent
with Hurst.
The Court in Carr rejected the defendant’s argument that
the instructions may have confused the jury by emphasizing that
the instructions given, and required by Kansas’s statutory
scheme, “ma[de] clear that both the existence of aggravating
circumstances and the conclusion that they outweigh mitigating
circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”136
Hence, Kansas’ statutory scheme complies with the Sixth
Amendment, as considered in the broad contours of Hurst,
because the jury is required not only to determine the existence
of an aggravating circumstance but also that aggravators
outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.137
Justice Scalia mused in dicta in Carr that “we doubt
whether it is even possible to apply a standard of proof to the
134. 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
135. Id. at 643-44.
136. Id. at 643.
137. Id.; see also Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173 (2006) (“In contrast, the
Kansas statute requires the State to bear the burden of proving to the jury, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that aggravators are not outweighed by mitigators.”).
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mitigating-factor determination,”138 calling it “largely a
judgment call.”139
He also offered that the weighing
determination “is mostly a question of mercy,” and “[i]t would
mean nothing, we think, to tell the jury that the defendants must
deserve mercy beyond a reasonable doubt.”140 While the Eighth
Amendment requires no such finding, the Sixth Amendment
does.141 Clearly, Kansas thought it possible for such a weighing
to be made beyond a reasonable doubt. And, as was discussed
above and to which this Article turns again below, the history of
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard shows it was meant for
exactly such “judgment calls.” It was given to the jury as a tool
of moral comfort in making a life or death decision.

IV. THE LOGICAL PROGRESSION FROM HURST
In compliance with Apprendi and its progeny, this Article
submits the jury, and not a judge, must make all findings
necessary to impose the death penalty, and it must make those
findings beyond a reasonable doubt. As Blakely stated, “the
relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a
judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”142
What are those findings? In weighing states, it is the finding of
an aggravator, it is the finding that aggravators outweigh
mitigating circumstances, and it is the finding that even then,
death is the appropriate punishment.143 In non-weighing states,
138. 136 S. Ct. at 642.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Also inapposite here is Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1995), which rejected
“the notion that ‘a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a
capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.’” Id. at 512 (citation omitted).
Harris was an Eighth Amendment decision and one decided before Apprendi. It is
doubtful Harris stands for anything with regard to the Sixth Amendment, and is no longer
viable after Apprendi and Hurst.
142. 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004).
143. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175.554(2) (West 2016). Some weighing
states have these three separate stages while most end the inquiry if the jury finds the
aggravators outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d
3, 19-20 (Ind. 2015) (holding that there was no sentencing error when the jury and trial
court imposed a death sentence upon determining that the aggravating factors outweighed
any mitigating factors); Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 607-08 (Pa. 2014)
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the schemes vary, but the endpoint is the same, all findings,
including the finding that death is the appropriate punishment,
must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. If the scheme lacks
this ultimate finding as a separate question for the jury, then the
scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. This conclusion is
greatly enhanced by the death-specific study of the history of
jury trials and of the reasonable doubt standard.

A. Weighing Determinations
Florida had to immediately grapple with Hurst. On
remand, the Supreme Court of Florida read Hurst’s tea leaves
and required that the jury, and not the judge, make the critical
weighing findings necessary before imposition of a death
sentence.144 Therefore, the court held that a jury was to decide
the existence of each aggravating factor; the finding “that the
aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death”; and the
finding that “aggravating factors outweigh mitigating
circumstances.”145 However, the Florida court simultaneously
misunderstood that complete compliance with Apprendi and
Hurst’s logical next steps requires that all findings must not only
be made by a jury but must be made beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Florida Supreme Court held that only the first of the three
findings must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, per Ring,
and did not require the standard for the other findings.146 Hence,
Florida joins the weighing states that do not require all findings
beyond a reasonable doubt.147

(finding that the jury clearly determined that aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating
factors and that a death sentence was properly imposed). The problem with the latter state
schemes, and the reason why jurors should be given an opportunity even after the weighing
to make the decision up or down, is that, too often, an inadequate defense attorney presents
little in mitigation. Jurors may well find that statutory aggravators literally “outweigh” the
non-existent or minimally existent mitigating circumstances in a botched robbery attempt,
for example, but still believe death is not proportional to the offense.
144. Hurst v. Florida, 202 So. 3d 40, 57 (Fla. 2016).
145. Id. at 53.
146. Id.
147. Most of the opinion is devoted to another core component of the jury trial right
in capital cases—unanimity. Whereas the previous statute had not required unanimity in
the death verdict, the Florida Supreme Court delved into history to outlaw this practice and
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All “weighing states” save two148 require that the finding
that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors must
precede a decision to impose death; life is the default
punishment absent the weighing.149 As for the two outliers, such
burden-shifting violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial and the right to have the prosecution carry the burden of
proof on factual findings leading to a death sentence beyond a
reasonable doubt. In any event, the finding that aggravators
outweigh mitigating circumstances is necessary to make a
defendant eligible for death and hence must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.150
What of the arguments by state and federal courts,
referenced above,151 that “weighing” is not a finding of fact but a
“normative,” “moral,” or “legal” judgment? It is certainly true
that any “weighing” the jury does is more normative than
factual. No one would believe that the jurors in a capital case sit
in the jury room with a scale, with aggravators on one side and
mitigating circumstances on the other. How would one weigh
the aggravating factor that the crime was heinous, atrocious, and
cruel (a “normative” issue if ever there was one) against the
mitigating circumstances of the youthful age and lack of record
of the offender? How might one weigh the elderly status of the
victim against the extreme distress or mental handicap of the
defendant? In making its weighing finding, the jury most likely
uses its moral sense after looking at the entire picture painted for
them by the litigants. This does not mean Apprendi does not
apply.

find a unanimous death verdict to be a critical component of the jury trial right. Id. at 5459.
148. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-752(G) (2016) (“At the penalty phase, the
defendant and the state may present any evidence that is relevant to the determination of
whether there is mitigation that us sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.”); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-6617(e) (West 2017) (“If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds . . . that the
existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating
circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to death;
otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.”).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See supra notes 115-117.
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Cabining Apprendi to only findings of fact, and not all
findings a jury must make, whatever their flavor, is too literal an
interpretation of that case and of the right to a jury trial. While
the holding of Apprendi discusses facts that increase the
maximum punishment, that does not mean Apprendi applies
only to facts. The Court has repeatedly demonstrated that “the
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect”:152 findings
“essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the
defendant receives—whether the statute calls them elements of
the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”153 The jury’s finding that
aggravators outweigh mitigating circumstances is a necessary
finding before death may be imposed. The finding is “essential
to the level of punishment that the defendant receives.”154
Hurst’s language signals that this is the case, although it
does shoehorn the weighing into a “factual finding”: “Florida
does not require the jury to make the critical findings necessary
to impose the death penalty,”155 and:
It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence,
but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to
the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge. A
Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s
findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does
a trial judge in Arizona.156

The clear signal of Hurst is that, if the issue were directly
presented to the Court, it would decide that the weighing
determination is subject to the Sixth Amendment and therefore
is a finding that must be made by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
It is worthy of note here that many of the findings we ask
the jury to make are not clearly just “factual.” Jurors may find
as fact that the defendant killed the victim but their finding as to
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 622 (2016) (emphasis added).
Id. at 622 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).

2017] DEATH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT

299

the defendant’s mens rea—e.g., whether he killed negligently,
whether he killed with “malice aforethought”—is a normative,
evaluative one.157 Jurors apply facts to law and make judgments,
evaluations, opinions, and conclusions. Ultimately, to decide
“guilt” beyond a reasonable doubt is not a factual finding but a
judgment or opinion.158 That is what the weighing determination
is.
Additionally, the history of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard set out above demonstrates that its very essence is to
provide a guide in moral, not factual, decisions. To say that
weighing is “normative” or is a “judgment” speaks to the very
origins of the reasonable doubt standard. As James Whitman
unearthed, it emanated from an obsession with “doubt and
death.”159 It counterbalanced a standard of no doubt, giving the
jury breathing room to make difficult, moral decisions in matters
of life and death.
Under this interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, the
death penalty statutes in the weighing states that do not require
that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravators
outweigh mitigating circumstances before death may be
imposed are all invalid.160 Assuming each of these states would
pass new statutes that comply with the requirement, there may
be a question whether the standard makes a difference. There is
in fact evidence of a correlative impact between the heightened
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt and death verdicts. In
2014, there were seventy-three death sentences in the United

157. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and the
Jury’s Role in Capital Sentencing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 529, 562-63 (2011) (making the
point that a jury deciding guilt on the elements of negligent homicide must make “some
very non-factual, subjective, even moral assessments about the defendant”).
158. Notably, the Court has wrangled with the term “factual findings” in the context
of the Federal Rules of Evidence and found it did not necessarily denote just “facts” but
could include conclusions and opinions drawn from facts. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988) (holding that “factual findings” includes opinions and
noting “the analytical difficulty of drawing . . . a line [between fact and opinion]”).
159. Whitman, supra note 44, at 157.
160. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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States in only twenty states.161 All but seven of these were
imposed in states that did not require the jury to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances
outweighed mitigating circumstances (or that death was the
appropriate punishment).162
In 2015, there were forty-nine death sentences imposed,
and three states imposed more than half of those death
sentences: Alabama (6), Florida (9) and California (14).163 If
we add Pennsylvania and Texas to Alabama, Florida, and
California, these five states produced the most death verdicts in
the country between 2012 and 2015,164 and none of them
required that the jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances
(or that death was the appropriate punishment).165 In Alabama
and Florida, the jury did not even make the decision but only
rendered an advisory verdict.166 Of the forty-nine death
sentences, all but four of these were imposed in states that did
not require the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
aggravating
circumstances
outweighed
mitigating
circumstances, or that death was the appropriate punishment.167
Even if there were not this correlation, the “reasonable
doubt” standard is a fundamental component of our criminal
justice system. Underscoring the importance of the high
standard of proof in a criminal trial, the Court has found that a
constitutionally deficient instruction on the meaning of
reasonable doubt can never be harmless and requires automatic

161. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year,
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-unitedstates-1977-present [https://perma.cc/W7PQ-FVPN].
162. Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty
Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 208 (1991).
163. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra
note 161.
164. See id.
165. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 109 (stating Alabama allowed judicial override of a jury’s life
verdict until the legislature eliminated it in 2017).
167. See Death Sentences in the United States from 1977 by State and by Year, supra
note 161.
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reversal.168 In Cage v. Louisiana,169 the Court summarily
reversed a conviction based upon use of the phrases “actual
substantial doubt” and “grave uncertainty,” which suggested a
“higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the
reasonable-doubt standard.”170 While debates over its phrasing
rage, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is a core
Constitutional right.

B. Non-Weighing Determinations
The typical non-weighing state statute substitutes the
weighing terminology with the requirement that the jury must
find an aggravator and more or less “consider” any mitigating
evidence when deciding if death is the appropriate
punishment.171 Hence, in states like Georgia, Louisiana, and
South Dakota, the jury is instructed it must find that at least one
aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt (per
Ring), and then it must consider any mitigating evidence
presented in deciding whether the death penalty should be
imposed.172
It would appear jurors have unbridled discretion at this
point to decide life or death without any reference to
“weighing.” However, as the Supreme Court itself has noted,
“The [weighing/non-weighing] terminology is somewhat
misleading, since we have held that in all capital cases the
sentencer must be allowed to weigh the facts and circumstances
that arguably justify a death sentence against the defendant’s
mitigating evidence.”173 Therefore, back in the jury room, things
likely look no different than in weighing states. Jurors are
looking at all of the evidence of aggravating and mitigating
factors put before them and making a holistic determination
168. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-82 (1993).
169. 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
170. Id. at 40-41.
171. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 279 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[D]rawing an arbitrary line in the sand between the ‘eligibility and selection phases’ of
the sentencing decision is, in my view, incoherent and ultimately doomed to failure.”).
172. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31(a) (West 2016); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 905.3 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-1 (2016).
173. Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216-17 (2006).
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whether death is appropriate under the circumstances. Jurors in
these non-weighing states are doing the same thing they are
doing in weighing states. The difference is they do not officially
make an intermediate determination but simply come out for or
against death. For the same reasons outlined for weighing states
and for the reasons outlined in the next section, the jurors here
too should be instructed that they have to make this decision
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Three states do require jurors to make intermediate
determinations.174 Taking Texas as an example, particularly
because it is so problematic, the jury must decide “whether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society”175
and must decide this probability beyond a reasonable doubt.176
If the jury finds this, then they must find that death should be
imposed unless “there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or
circumstances to warrant . . . a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole . . . .”177
There is inherent confusion in
instructing a jury to find a probability beyond a reasonable
doubt. This provision not only lowers the constitutional
standard but it then forces the jury’s hand to find death without
benefit of the standard of making the prosecution prove it is
appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt. This forced scheme is
far from the jury trial right given the community for hundreds of
years, giving jurors the protection of a standard to make a moral
decision that only they are authorized to make.

C. Death as the Appropriate Punishment
Does the Hurst language also logically lead to a Sixth
Amendment requirement that the jury must find, after all other
findings are made, that, under the circumstances, death is the
appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable doubt? As already
noted, a few state statutes isolate this as a final question for the
174.
175.
176.
177.

See supra note 112 (referencing Oregon, Texas and Virginia).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West 2013).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 37.071(c).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(e)(1).
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jurors after weighing, but many do not. If the statute does
isolate the issue, there is no coherent reason why this question
should be treated any differently than the questions that precede
it. Hurst says that “[t]he Sixth Amendment requires a jury, not a
judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of
death,”178 but then goes on to soften “facts” into “findings.”179
That death is appropriate is a finding necessary to impose death,
and so it seems under Hurst’s logic that it must be made by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. However, very few states
isolate this as a separate step and it is unclear Hurst goes that far
yet. However, Hurst emanates from Apprendi, and Apprendi
interprets the Sixth Amendment according to its historical roots.
The historical roots of the jury trial right and its attendant
beyond a reasonable doubt standard answer the question at the
top of this paragraph “yes.”
History demonstrates the community’s right to decide
punishment in a capital case, and the right to have a standard to
apply—death beyond a reasonable doubt—to protect its moral
conscience. History counsels that states have to give the
community the ultimate question separately from any and all
steps that come before. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard
had as its target the moral conscience of jurors in deciding
whether to put a man to death: that was its raison d’être. Both
the standard and the requirement of twelve unanimous jurors
were “moral comfort” tools for those who were put to the task of
deciding whether a man should be executed. The standard was
aimed at punishment, not fact finding.
There is no reason to believe jurors do not need that moral
comfort today as well in capital cases. It is an awesome
decision, and to ask them to make it without giving them an
instruction on a standard is to leave them rudderless and
uncertain. There is evidence that jurors who sit in capital cases
and return death verdicts suffer great anxiety long after the

178. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
179. Id. at 622.
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verdict is returned.180 They have a right to answer the life or
death question with a standard to guide them. Two states have
gotten this right: Delaware and Utah.
Delaware was a state where the jury gave an advisory
opinion and the judge could ignore it.181 Post-Hurst, the
Delaware Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional in
Rauf v. State.182 The court, in a per curiam opinion, not only
decided to read Hurst broadly and understood it to mean that all
factual findings had to be made by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, but Chief Justice Strine, writing for a plurality, found that
the Sixth Amendment required a jury to make the ultimate
determination of death beyond a reasonable doubt:
I find it impossible to embrace a reading of Hurst that
judicially draws a limit to the right to a jury in the death
penalty context to having the jury make only the
determinations necessary to make the defendant eligible to
be sentenced to death by someone else, rather than to make
the determinations itself that must be made if the defendant
is in fact to receive a death sentence. I am unable to discern
in the Sixth Amendment any dividing line between the
decision that someone is eligible for death and the decision
that he should in fact die.183

Justice Strine engaged in a lengthy discussion of the
hundreds of years of history of the role of the jury in capital
cases, noting that “[t]he proposition that any defendant should
go to his death without a jury of his peers deciding that should
happen would have been alien to the Founders.”184 He
concluded that when the Supreme Court required in Hurst “a
jury, not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a
180. See Leigh B. Bienen, Helping Jurors Out: Post-Verdict Debriefing for Jurors in
Emotionally Disturbing Trials, 68 IND. L.J. 1333, 1338 n.21 (1993) (noting jurors have
emotional trouble after capital trials).
181. See Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430, 434-35 (Del. 2016).
182. Id. at 434. The Delaware Attorney General’s office will not appeal the ruling.
Delaware Attorney General Will Not Appeal Decision Striking Down Death Penalty
Statute, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6531
[https://perma.cc/E4M2-JAP3]. Hence, as of today, Delaware no longer has the death
penalty.
183. Rauf, 145 A.3d at 436.
184. Id.
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sentence of death,”185 it was aware that, “[i]f those words mean
what they say, they extend the role of a death penalty jury
beyond the question of eligibility” but to selectivity.186
Therefore, the Constitution required that a jury of twelve must
unanimously decide death beyond a reasonable doubt for it to be
imposed.
As the only state that explicitly requires that jurors make a
separate finding that death is the appropriate punishment beyond
a reasonable doubt, the Utah Supreme Court defended this
standard in a straightforward way, not attempting to shoehorn it
into a factual finding:
The ultimate purpose in the penalty phase is not one of
factfinding, but the fixing of a penalty, and the fixing of a
penalty is a matter of judgment about what penal
consequences should attach to the commission of a capital
crime by a particular defendant. The reasonable doubt
standard is, of course, also employed as a standard for
factfinding; but that standard, which is only used when the
most basic interests are at stake, also conveys to a decision
maker a sense of the solemnity of the task and the necessity
for a high degree of certitude, given the nature of the values
to be weighed, in imposing the death sentence.187

The fixing of a penalty is exactly what jurors were doing
when the jury trial right and the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard were being refined during the years of the founding of
our nation. Utah seems to have gotten it exactly right.
A study of the history of the jury trial right and the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard show that in capital cases they were
not tied so tightly to the “fact finding” language of Apprendi,
Ring, and Hurst. Rather, at the time of the founding of our
nation, and there is no reason it should be different now, the
community, in the form of a jury, decided whether men would
live or die, and for that bald decision, they had the moral
protection of a reasonable doubt standard.

185. Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016).
186. Rauf, 145 A.3d at 464.
187. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 84 (Utah 1982).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court opened a window on the jury trial right
in Apprendi v. New Jersey and has continued to prop it open.
Through that window came Hurst v. Florida, where Justice
Sotomayor signaled the Court’s willingness to entertain further
applications of the right in capital cases. While it is clear from
Ring v. Arizona and Hurst that the jury must find any
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, Hurst indicates
that the jury trial right would attach to any findings necessary
for imposition of death. That would mean, at the very least, that
jurors in “weighing” states would have to find the aggravators
outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Less clear from the Court’s decision and Apprendi’s
applications is whether it also means that before death may be
imposed, a jury must find the penalty appropriate beyond a
reasonable doubt. This Article used a historical approach to this
question, as the Court has done in interpreting the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial right. In capital cases, for hundreds of
years, it has been the right of the community, and not a judge, to
decide on the penalty of death. Because this was, and still is,
such an awesome decision, philosophers and legal thinkers in
the eighteenth century minted the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard to protect the jurors’ moral consciences in the
imposition of this draconian punishment. Ironically, given how
it is viewed today, it was designed to make imposition easier, as
jurors were reluctant to impose it with no guidance lest they
suffer great harm were they to sentence to death an innocent
man.
Jurors today, no less than yesterday, should have the
guidance of a standard—one held so important as to require
reversal if misstated in noncapital cases—on which to decide
life or death. It is surely grotesque to constitutionally require a
jury find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a fraud case but to
have no such constitutional requirement in a case where a man
or woman’s life hangs in the balance. It is both an individual
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and collective concern for the criminal justice system and the
Court has the means and, perhaps the will, to address it.

